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the execution of a task necessitates the use of a specific response modality. We examined the role 
of different response modalities by using a task-switching paradigm. in experiment 1, subjects 
switched between two numerical judgments, whereas response modality (vocal vs. manual vs. 
foot responses) was manipulated between groups. We found judgment-shift costs in each group, 
that is irrespective of the response modality. in experiment 2, subjects switched between response 
modalities (vocal vs. manual, vocal vs. foot, or manual vs. foot). We observed response-modality 
shift costs that were comparable in all groups. in sum, the experiments suggest that the response 
modality (combination) does not affect switching per se. yet, modality-shift costs occur when sub-
jects switch between response modalities. thus, we suppose that modality-shift costs are not due 
to a purely motor-related mechanisms but rather emerge from a general switching process. con-
sequently, the response modality has to be considered as a cognitive component in models of task 
switching.
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IntroductIon
In  cognitive  psychology,  it  is  usually  assumed  that,  for  each  task, 
there exists a cognitive representation of processes necessary to per-
form this task. This cognitive task representation is termed task set 
(see e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Vandierendonck, Christiaens, & 
Liefooghe, 2008). For example, to perform a parity task (“Is a digit 
odd or even?”), subjects are assumed to encode a visually presented 
stimulus, to decide whether it is odd or even, and to indicate this deci-
sion by pressing one of two response keys. The notion of cognitive task 
representations is often centered on cognitive aspects of a task. That 
is, for example, the numerical judgment or the mapping of a stimulus 
category (e.g., “odd”) to a response category (e.g., “left”). In contrast to 
these cognitive aspects, the role of the motor execution has received 
only very little research attention. Specifically, it is widely unknown 
whether the modality (e.g., vocal vs. manual) in which a response is 
executed affects task performance and the cognitive representation 
of tasks. 
In the present study, we aimed to investigate the role of the re-
sponse modality in cognitive task representations. To do so, we used 
a task-switching paradigm (for reviews, see e.g., Kiesel et al., 2010; 
Monsell, 2003). In the task-switching paradigm, subjects are intro-
duced to different tasks and are required to execute them in a changing 
sequence. When subjects have to switch the task from one trial to the 
next, performance is usually worse than when a task is repeated in two 
successive trials (“shift costs”, see e.g., Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; 
Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). In the cuing version of the 
task-switching paradigm (see Meiran, 1996), the relevant task of each 
trial is indicated by a cue. By manipulating the time between cue and 
imperative stimulus (cue-stimulus interval, CSI), one can also manipu-
late the task preparation time. 
To explore the role of response modalities (i.e., the influence of 
motor execution) in task switching we specifically examined which 
effects are observed when subjects switch between response modali-
ties. However, before we turn to this question, it is also important to 
ask whether task-switching performance is affected by the response 
modality subjects are required to use (e.g., vocal vs. manual responses 
throughout the experiment). Some findings indicated the relevance AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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of this question. For example, Hunt and Klein (2002) compared eye 
movements and manual responses in a task-switching experiment. In 
their study, one group of subjects performed eye-movements towards 
or away from a visually presented stimulus (i.e., prosaccades vs. anti-
saccades), and another group of subjects performed spatially compa-
tible or incompatible key presses to the same kind of stimuli. The result 
pattern differed between both response modalities: Residual shift costs 
(i.e., that part of shift costs that remains even after a long CSI; Rogers 
& Monsell, 1995) were found for manual responses but not for eye-
movements. In another study, Brass and von Cramon (2007) compared 
manual and foot responses in a task-switching study. In this study, 
subjects were required to switch between two numerical judgments 
(magnitude vs. parity). In one half of the blocks, subjects responded 
manually, in the other half they responded by foot responses. With re-
spect to shift costs both the behavioral data pattern and the prefrontal 
brain activation observed with functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) were comparable for manual and foot responses. Yet, a differ-
ence emerged again with respect to the influence of preparation time. 
After a long preparation time, residual shift costs were largely elimi-
nated for manual responses but not for foot responses.
Furthermore, the influence of the response modality appears to 
depend on specific aspects of the task set, for example the stimulus 
modality  (e.g., Stelzel,  Schumacher,  Schubert,  &  D’Esposito,  2006). 
Recently, Stephan and Koch (2010) demonstrated that both reaction 
time (RT) and shift costs increase when incompatible stimulus modal-
ity/response modality pairings (i.e., visual-vocal and auditory-manual) 
are used as compared to compatible stimulus modality/response mo-
dality pairings (i.e., visual-manual and auditory-vocal).
In the present study (Experiment 1), we compared task-switching 
performance across three different response modalities: vocal, manual, 
and foot responses. In Experiment 2, we were specifically interested in 
the effects of switching between different response modalities. Here, 
previous studies (Arrington, Altmann, & Carr, 2003; Sohn & Anderson, 
2003; Yeung & Monsell, 2003) suggest that a switch of the response 
modality increases shift costs. For example, in the study of Arrington 
et al., subjects switched among four different tasks. Each task had its 
own response categories; two tasks required vocal responses and two 
tasks required manual responses. The results showed that the shift costs 
were larger when both the response modality and the response catego-
ries had to be switched as compared to switching the response category 
only. However, all studies mentioned above do not allow examining 
the effect of response modalities or motor execution in isolation (i.e., 
independent  from  the  influence  of  the  cognitive  control  processes 
necessary to switch between response categories or judgments). This 
argument also applies to a study of Philipp and Koch (2010), in which 
subjects switched between two numerical judgments and two response 
modalities. 
Thus, in Experiment 2 of  the present study, subjects had to per-
form the same numerical judgment in each trial but switched between 
response  modalities  (e.g.,  vocal  and  manual  responses).  A  similar 
procedure  was  already  adopted  in  the  study  of  Philipp  and  Koch 
(2005). However, as regards that study, it is important to note that 
each subject switched among three response modalities (i.e., vocal vs. 
manual vs. foot responses) and a repetition of response modalities was 
excluded so that questions concerning modality-shift costs could not 
be addressed. In contrast, the present study focused explicitly on mo-
dality-shift costs and their possible reduction with a long preparation 
time. 
The observation of modality-shift costs would improve our under-
standing of both the mechanisms underlying task switching and the 
relevance of motor control processes. On the one hand, modality-shift 
costs would indicate that response modalities can play a role in task 
switching and, thus, have to be included in models of task switching. 
On the other hand, modality-shift costs would also indicate that motor 
control and the selection of a response modality has the same conse-
quences as cognitive control and the selection of a stimulus categoriza-
tion rule (i.e., judgment). 
ExpErImEnt 1
In Experiment 1, we compared three different response modalities: 
vocal, manual, and foot responses. To this end, subjects switched be-
tween two numerical judgment tasks (parity vs. magnitude), whereas 
the response modality was manipulated between groups (vocal group 
vs. manual group vs. foot group). Additionally, we manipulated the 
preparation time (CSI) within subjects to examine preparation effects. 
The aim of this first experiment was to compare the pattern of results 
of an identical judgment-switching design across different response 
modalities.   
Method
SubjectS, Stimuli, and taSkS 
Twenty-four  subjects  (13  female,  mean  age  =  26.9  years)  were 
evenly assigned to the three experimental groups (vocal, manual, and 
foot). They received 8 € for participation. Stimuli consisted of the digits 
1-9, excluding 5. Subjects had to decide whether a digit was smaller or 
larger than 5 (magnitude judgment) and whether it was odd or even 
(parity judgment). Stimuli were presented one at a time in white in 
a frame at the centre of a black screen (15“ monitor) connected to an 
IBM-compatible PC. The digits were 1 cm high and approximately 
0.5 cm wide. The viewing distance was approximately 60 cm. The frame, 
which served as judgment cue, was white and had either the shape of 
a diamond (5.3 cm wide/high), indicating the magnitude judgment, or 
of a square (3.8 cm wide/high), indicating the parity judgment.
Manual responses were made on an external keyboard with two 
response keys for the left and right index finger. Response keys mea-
sured 1.2 cm by 1.7 cm and were separated by 3.8 cm. Foot responses 
were given on a separate external keyboard with two response keys (6.0 
cm by 6.0 cm, separated by 23.5 cm) for the left and right foot. Vocal 
responses were expressed by saying “left” or “right” (i.e., subjects had 
to say the German words “links” and “rechts”). Speech onset was re-
corded in milliseconds using a voice-key; accuracy of “left” and “right” 
responses  were  coded  by  the  experimenter  with  the  left  and  right 
cursor key.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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Procedure 
The experiment was run in a single session of approximately 60 min. 
Instructions were both given on the monitor and orally. An instruction 
sheet concerning the stimulus-response mapping (e.g., “odd-left”) was 
placed in front of each subject throughout the experiment. The four 
possible mappings were counterbalanced across subjects. 
Two practice blocks were run with ten trials each. One practice 
block had short CSI (100 ms), the other long CSI (1000 ms). The ex-
periment itself consisted of eight blocks of 96 trials each. Before each 
block, subjects were informed about CSI in the next block. Blocks with 
short and long CSI alternated within one experiment; CSI duration in 
the first block was counterbalanced across subjects.
A trial started with a black screen followed by a cue. After a vari-
able preparation time (CSI), the stimulus was presented in the middle 
of the cue frame and a 600 Hz warning tone was played simultane-
ously. The interval between the response of the subject and the next 
stimulus (response-stimulus interval, RSI) was 1.6 s after manual and 
foot responses. The RSI after vocal responses varied somewhat around 
1.6 s because the experimenter had to code vocal responses for accura-
cy, so that the time between the response of a subject and the next cue 
(response-cue interval, RCI) depended on the RT of the experimenter. 
The timing of the vocal trials was such that the interval between re-
sponse of the subject and cue was identical to the RCI in manual and 
foot trials – at least when the RT of the experimenter in vocal trials 
was 300 ms. Thus, in manual and foot trials RSI was held constant at 
1600 ms with response-cue interval being either 1500 ms or 600 ms, 
and CSI being either 100 ms or 1000 ms (i.e., RCI 1500/CSI 100 vs. RCI 
600/CSI 1000). Vocal trials had approximately the same RCI and RSI. 
The sequence of trials was controlled for an equal number of each 
numerical judgment, stimulus category (odd vs. even, or smaller vs. 
larger), and judgment sequence (judgment repetition vs. judgment 
switch). Immediate repetition of a stimulus was excluded. 
Subjects always received visual error feedback for 500 ms when 
they pressed the wrong key (German: “Falsche Taste”). 
deSign 
Judgment  transition  (judgment  switch  vs.  judgment  repetition) 
and CSI (100 ms vs. 1000 ms) were within-subject independent var-
iables when analyzing each group individually in a first step. For the 
comparison of groups, Group (vocal vs. manual vs. foot) was added as 
between-subjects variable. RTs and error percentage were measured as 
dependent variables. For these and all following analyses, significance 
was tested at α = .05.
Results
The  first  two  trials  of  each  block  were  discarded  from  analysis. 
Additionally, trials in which the RT was below 200 ms or three stan-
dard deviations above each subjects mean RT were discarded from 
both RT and error analyses (1.8% of the trials). RT analyses included 
only correct trials preceded by at least one other correct trial. RT and 
error data are shown in Table 1.
individual analySeS of reSPonSe-modality 
grouPS 
In a first step, each group was analyzed separately using two-way 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with judgment transition (judgment 
switch  vs.  judgment  repetition)  and  CSI  (100  ms  vs.  1000  ms)  as 
within-subject independent variables. 
For the vocal group, the RT analysis revealed significant effects of 
judgment transition, F(1, 7) = 41.7, p < .001, ηp² = .856; and of CSI, 
F(1, 7) = 16.2, p < .01, ηp² = .698. The interaction of judgment transition 
and CSI was not significant, F(1, 7) = 2.1, p = .19. In the error analy-
sis, no main effect or interaction was significant: judgment transition, 
F(1, 7) = 3.9; CSI and judgment transition x CSI, Fs < 1.
For the finger group, both RT and error analyses revealed a sig-
nificant effect of judgment transition, F(1, 7) = 14.6, p < .01, ηp² = .676 
for RT; and F(1, 7) = 14.1, p < .01, ηp² = .668 for error data. The ef-
fect of CSI was significant in the RT analysis, F(1, 7) = 45.7, p < .001, 
ηp² = .867; but not in the error analysis, F(1, 7) = 1.2, p = .32. Further, 
the interaction of judgment transition and CSI was marginally signifi-
cant in the RT analysis, F(1, 7) = 4.8, p = .064, ηp² = .407; but not in the 
error analysis, F < 1.
For the foot group, again the main effects of judgment transition, 
F(1, 7) = 21.8, p < .01, ηp² = .757; and of CSI, F(1, 7) = 12.8, p < .01, 
ηp² = .647, were significant. The error analysis showed a similar pat-
tern: judgment transition, F(1, 7) = 4.3, p = .076, ηp² = .382; and CSI, 
F(1, 7) = 14.1, p < .01, ηp² = .669. The interaction of judgment transition 
and CSI was not significant in either RT or error analysis, Fs < 1.2.
tAble 1. 
experiment  1:  reaction  times  as  a  Function  of  Judgment 
transition  (switch  vs.  repetition),  response-Modality  group 
(vocal vs. Manual vs. Foot), and cue-stimulus interval (100 ms 
vs. 1000 ms). 
Judgement transition
Switch Repetition
Shift costs 
(switch - repeat)
Vocal group
CSI 100 1187 (5.1) 1031 (2.8) 156 (2.3)
CSI 1000 1002 (5.0) 882 (3.0) 120 (2.0)
Manual group
CSI 100 815 (7.3) 707 (4.9) 108 (2.4)
CSI 1000 619 (6.3) 548 (4.1) 71 (2.2)
Foot group
CSI 100 1291 (8.7) 1136 (6.3) 155 (2.4)
CSI 1000 1130 (6.4) 962 (5.2) 168 (1.2)
Note.  Reaction  times  in  milliseconds.  Error  percentage  in  parentheses.                             
CSI = cue stimulus interval. AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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Taken  together,  substantial  judgment-shift  costs  as  well  as  a 
reduction  of  the  overall  RT  with  a  long  preparation  time  were 
observed  in  all  response-modality  groups.  Thus,  judgment-shift  
costs  and  a  general  preparation  effect  emerged  irrespective  of  the 
response modality that was used to indicate the response. Yet, dif-
ferences between groups seem to appear when we look at the reduc-
tion of shift costs with a long preparation time. Whereas a numeri-
cal (albeit not significant) reduction occurred in the vocal and the 
finger  group,  the  effect  was  numerically  even  reversed  in  the  foot 
group. 
comPariSon of grouPS 
To directly compare the groups, we further calculated  between-
group comparisons on RT and error data. Replicating the individual 
analyses, both RT and error analyses showed significant effects of judg-
ment transition, RT: F(1, 21) = 68.7, p < .001, ηp² = .766; and error: 
F(1, 21) = 16.9, p < .001, ηp² = .446; and of CSI, RT: F(1, 21) = 57.2, 
p < .001, ηp² = .731; and error: F(1, 21) = 4.5, p < .05, ηp² = .176; but no 
significant interaction of judgment transition and CSI (Fs < 1). Group 
did not produce a significant interaction with judgment transition 
or CSI in either RT or error analysis. Further, the three-way interac-
tion was not significant (all Fs < 1.9). Thus, the comparison of groups 
did not reveal a significant difference between groups with respect to 
judgment-shift costs or preparation effects. 
However, there was a general difference between groups. In the 
RT analysis, the effect of group was significant, F(2, 21) = 5.1, p < .05, 
ηp² = .325. The RT was 1026 ms for vocal responses, 672 ms for man-
ual responses, and 1130 ms for foot responses. In the error analysis, 
the main effect of group was also significant, F(2, 21) = 3.8, p < .05, 
ηp² = .267. Subjects made 3.9% errors in the vocal group, 5.6% in the 
manual group, and 6.6% in the foot group. 
Discussion
All three response-modality groups showed a comparable data pattern 
in which a judgment repetition was faster and more accurate than a 
judgment switch. Thus, judgment-shift costs emerged irrespective of 
the response modality that was used to indicate a response. Moreover, 
we found the same general benefit of a long preparation time across all 
groups. Consequently, we suggest that the response modality had no 
influence on general judgment preparation effects.
As regards residual shift costs, however, the judgment-shift costs 
were not reduced with a long preparation time. Furthermore, as the 
influence of preparation time on the size of shift costs was numerically 
different between response modalities, the present results could be seen 
a further indication that residual shift costs may differ as a function of 
the response modality (see also Brass & von Cramon, 2007; Hunt & 
Klein, 2002). Yet, at the moment it is difficult to draw any conclusions 
with respect to the role of task preparation in response modality effects 
so that further research is needed. 
However, for the present purpose it is most important that the mo-
dality in which the subjects had to indicate their response decision (i.e., 
right vs. left) does not significantly influence the general data pattern 
and the occurrence of judgment-shift costs. Yet, differences were found 
between the modalities concerning the overall speed and accuracy of 
responses.  This  difference  presumably  resulted  from  every-day  life 
experiences of subjects, because foot responses are not as well prac-
ticed as either manual or vocal responses. Further, we also observed a 
speed-accuracy trade off between vocal and manual responses. Vocal 
responses were slower but more accurate than manual responses (cf. 
Zirngibl & Koch, 2002). 
ExpErImEnt 2
In Experiment 2, we examined the effect of switching between re-
sponse  modalities.  Here,  subjects  switched  between  two  different 
response  modalities  while  the  numerical  judgment  was  the  same 
in  each  trial.  To  increase  the  generality,  three  different  response-
modality  groups  were  compared.  One  group  of  subjects  switched 
between  vocal  and  manual  responses  (vocal/manual  group),  one 
group switched between vocal and foot responses (vocal/foot group), 
and  a  third  group  switched  between  manual  and  foot  responses 
(manual/foot group). Additionally, each group was divided, so that 
half of each group had to perform the magnitude judgment and half 
had  to  perform  the  parity  judgment  throughout  the  experiment. 
However, no systematic effect of the type of judgment was expected 
(see Philipp & Koch, 2005). Therefore, the type of judgment was not 
considered in the analysis. Like in Experiment 1, a manipulation of 
the cue-stimulus interval (100 ms vs. 1000 ms) was included to exam-
ine the influence of the preparation time on possible modality-shift 
costs.
Method
Twenty-four new subjects (20 female, mean age = 26.7 years) were 
tested and received 8 € for participation. They were evenly assigned 
to the experimental groups. Stimuli, numerical judgments, and pro-
cedure were identical to Experiment 1. However, each subject had to 
perform only one numerical judgment throughout the experiment. 
Also, the cue frame served as modality cue. In the vocal/manual group, 
vocal responses were indicated by the diamond and manual responses 
by the square. In the vocal/foot group, a diamond indicated vocal re-
sponses and a square indicated foot responses. Finally, in the manual/
foot group, the diamond indicated manual responses and the square 
indicated foot responses. 
In Experiment 2, modality transition (modality switch vs. modal-
ity repetition) and CSI (100 ms vs. 1000 ms) were within-subjects 
variables. Group (vocal/manual vs. vocal/foot vs. manual/foot) was a 
between-subjects variable. RTs and error percentage were measured as 
dependent variables. 
Results
The first two trials of each block as well as trials with an RT below 
200 ms or three standard deviations above each subjects mean RT were 
discarded from the analyses (1.8% of the trials). RT analysis included 
only correct trials preceded by at least one other correct trial. AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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rt analySiS
The three-way ANOVA with modality transition (modality switch 
vs. modality repetition) and CSI (100 ms vs. 1000 ms) as within-subject 
independent variables and with group (vocal/manual vs. vocal/foot vs. 
manual/foot) as between-subjects variable revealed a significant effect 
of modality transition, F(1, 21) = 34.2, p < .001, ηp² = .620, indicat-
ing longer RTs with a modality switch (752 ms) than with a modality 
repetition (652 ms). Thus, on average modality-shift costs of 100 ms 
occurred.
The main effect of CSI, F(1, 21) = 90.5, p < .001, ηp² = .812, as well 
as  the  interaction  of  modality  transition  and  CSI  were  significant, 
F(1, 21) = 29.3, p < .001, ηp² = .582. A long preparation time reduced 
both the overall RT level (from 776 ms to 627 ms) and the modality-
shift costs (from 133 ms to 67 ms). Importantly, none of these effects 
was influenced by group (Fs < 1). Additionally, the main effect of group 
was not significant (F < 1). 
error analySiS
The  three-way  ANOVA  with  modality  transition  and  CSI  as 
within-subject  independent  variables  and  with  group  as  between-
subjects variable revealed a significant effect of modality transition, 
F(1, 21) = 22.9, p < .001, ηp² = .522, indicating that a modality switch 
produced more errors (7.4%) than a modality repetition (4.5%). The 
effect of CSI was significant, F(1, 21) = 5.7, p < .05, ηp² = .212, showing 
that a long CSI reduced the error rate from 6.5% to 5.3%. The analy-
sis yielded a significant interaction of modality transition and CSI, 
F(1, 21) = 7.1, p < .05, ηp² = .252, indicating that a long CSI reduced 
modality-shift costs from 4.1% to 1.7%. None of these findings was af-
fected by group (Fs < 1.5). The main effect of group was not significant 
(F < 1).
effect of reSPonSe modalitieS 
In a second step, we analyzed each group individually to examine 
effects of the specific response modalities (vocal vs. manual vs. foot, 
see Table 2). In the analyses, response modality (vocal vs. manual, 
vocal vs. foot, manual vs. foot), modality transition (modality switch 
vs. modality repetition), and CSI (100 ms vs. 1000 ms) were within-
subjects independent variables. As we are specifically interested in the 
influence of response modalities in these analyses, we focus on this 
variable. However, it is interesting to point out that the main effects 
of modality transition and CSI as well as the interaction of modality 
transition and CSI were significant for each group in the individual RT 
analyses (except the effect of modality transition in the manual/foot 
group, which was only marginally significant, F(1, 21) = 4.9, p = .062, 
ηp² = .413. Further, the effect of modality transition was also significant 
in the error analyses of the vocal/foot group, F(1, 7) = 14.2, p < .01, 
ηp²  =  .669,  and  the  manual/foot  group,  F(1,  7)  =  12.3,  p  <  .05, 
ηp² = .638.
With respect to response modality, RT analyses revealed significant 
main effects of response modality for each group: In the vocal/manual 
group, RTs were larger for vocal (889 ms) than for manual responses 
(615 ms), F(1, 7) = 55.1, p < .001, ηp² = .887; in the vocal/foot group
RTs were larger for vocal (737 ms) than for foot responses (634 ms), 
F(1, 7) = 12.7, p < .01, ηp² = .644; and in the manual/foot group RTs 
were larger for foot (692 ms) than for manual responses (658 ms), 
F(1, 7) = 8.9, p < .05, ηp² = .559. In the error analyses, the effect of 
response modality was significant only for the vocal/manual group, 
F(1, 7) = 15.5, p < .01, ηp² = .689, indicating more errors with vocal 
(7.6%)  than  with  manual  (4.8%)  responses  (for  both  other  groups 
Fs < 2.1).
The  RT  analysis  in  the  vocal/manual  group  revealed  a  sig-
nificant  interaction  of  response  modality  and  modality  transition, 
F(1, 7) = 7.4, p < .05, ηp² = .513, showing larger modality-shift costs 
for vocal (136 ms) than for manual responses (96 ms). Neither the 
tAble 2. 
experiment  2:  reaction  times  as  a  Function  of  Modality 
transition  (switch  vs.  repetition),  response  Modality  (vocal 
vs. Manual, vocal vs. Foot, Manual vs. Foot), and cue-stimulus 
interval (100 ms vs. 1000 ms).
Modality transition
Switch Repetition
Shift costs 
(switch - repeat)
Vocal/manual group
Vocal responses
CSI 100 1043 (9.0) 894 (6.8) 149 (2.2)
CSI 1000  872 (8.7) 750 (5.9) 122 (2.8)
Manual responses
CSI 100 753 (5.9) 612 (4.0) 141 (1.9)
CSI 1000 573 (4.9) 521 (4.2) 52 (0.7)
Vocal/foot group
Vocal responses
CSI 100 863 (8.4) 735 (2.9) 128 (5.5)
CSI 1000 707 (4.3)  644 (2.8) 63 (1.5)
Foot responses
CSI 100 760 (8.0) 639 (2.3) 121 (5.7)
CSI 1000 586 (5.0) 551 (3.3) 35 (1.7)
Manual/foot groop
Manual responses
CSI 100 819 (9.4) 674 (4.9) 145 (4.5)
CSI 1000 604 (5.3) 534 (4.1) 70 (1.2)
Foot responses
CSI 100 830 (10.8) 728 (6.5) 102 (4.3)
CSI 1000 628 (8.6) 581 (6.3) 47 (2.3)
Note.  Reaction  times  in  milliseconds.  Error  percentage  in  parentheses.                             
CSI = cue stimulus interval. AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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interaction of response modality and CSI, F(1, 7) < 2.2, p = .18, nor the 
three-way interaction of response modality, modality transition, and 
CSI, F(1, 7) = 3.1, p = .12, were significant. The error analysis in the 
vocal/manual group yielded no significant interactions (all Fs < 2.7). 
Further, neither RT nor error analyses yielded any significant interac-
tion of response modality in the vocal/foot or in the manual/foot group 
(all Fs < 1.8). 
Discussion
In  Experiment  2,  we  found  modality-shift  costs.  That  is,  the  per-
formance of subjects was better in modality-repetition trials than in 
modality-switch trials. Additionally, these modality-shift costs as well 
as the general RT level were reduced with a long CSI. This finding indi-
cates that subjects could use a long preparation time to prepare for the 
upcoming response modality. Experiment 2 thus clearly demonstrated 
that response modalities can play a crucial role in the task-switching 
paradigm. Furthermore, the data pattern is similar to experiments in 
which subjects switched between two stimulus categorization tasks 
(see e.g., Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) and thus supports the 
notion that switching between two response modalities is functionally 
similar to switching between two judgments.
As an additional finding, the results indicate that it does not mat-
ter between which two response modalities subjects have to switch. 
Furthermore, response modalities did not systematically differ with re-
spect to the size of modality-shift costs. Although modality-shift costs 
were larger for vocal than for manual responses in the vocal/manual 
group, we did not observe comparable effects in the other two groups.   
However, as in Experiment 1, we observed a general influence of the re-
sponse modality on performance, namely that vocal and foot responses 
take longer than manual responses. In contrast to Experiment 1, vocal 
responses in Experiment 2 were even slower than foot responses and 
resulted in more errors than manual responses.
GEnEral dIscussIon
In the present study, we examined the role of response modalities in the 
cognitive representation of tasks by means of a cued task-switching ex-
periment. In Experiment 1, subjects switched between two numerical 
judgements and the response modality was constant throughout the 
experiment but manipulated between groups. We observed judgment-
shift costs for each response-modality group so that we suppose that 
the response modality per se does not substantially alter switching 
between  judgments.  In  Experiment  2,  subjects  switched  between 
two response modalities and the numerical judgment was constant 
throughout  the  experiment.  In  this  experiment,  we  observed  sub-
stantial modality-shift costs, indicating the response modalities play a 
crucial role in task switching.
The main focus of the present study was the effect of switching 
between response modalities. In contrast to switching between judg-
ments,  switching  between  response  modalities  requires  a  flexible 
adaptation concerning the motor execution of the response. In Experi-
ment 2 of our study, subjects performed the same judgment in each
trial but switched between two response modalities to execute a right-
left response. The results show costs of modality switching, indicating 
that “task switching” took place although the judgment was the same 
in each trial. 
The observation that shift costs occur when subjects perform the 
same numerical judgement in each trial but switch between response 
modalities constitutes a novel empirical demonstration. This finding is 
theoretically interesting because it shows the role of response-modality 
switching when being manipulated in isolation (i.e., independent from 
a manipulation of judgments or response categories). Additionally, 
the experiment provides clear evidence that tasks differing only in 
the response modality are indeed represented as two distinct task sets 
(see also Philipp & Koch, 2005). As an important consequence, this 
finding also implies that a “task set” does not include a mapping of 
a stimulus category to a response category only. Rather the modality 
in which a response has to be executed appears to be an important 
information as well. In this way, the present study also suggests that the 
representation of the response modality is not purely motor-related but 
plays a role for the cognitive representation of the task. In other words, 
the response modality does not come into play to simply indicate the 
result of a “cognitive task” but is an integral part of the cognitive task 
representation.
In this context, it is also important to point out that we observed 
no difference for switching between manual and foot responses and 
switching between vocal and manual or foot responses, respectively. 
In manual and foot responses, the left/right decision is executed with 
different  effectors,  whereas  the  same  effector,  namely  the  mouth, 
is used for the left/right decision in vocal responses. Thus, response 
preparation and execution can be assumed to rely on abstract response 
codes  (the  words  “left”  and  “right”)  in  verbal  responses,  whereas 
motor preparation and execution is effector-specific in manual and 
foot responses. Preparing one versus two effectors is also known to 
influence RTs and neural activity in pointing tasks (see e.g., Adam et 
al., 2003). Yet, despite the difference in the motor representation, no 
difference in switching between any combinations of two response 
modalities was found in our study. This further supports the idea that 
shift costs observed in Experiment 2 were due to cognitive processes 
of switching the task and not due to primarily motor-related factors. 
Additionally, this finding demonstrates that differences in the motor 
control demand that remain constant across the experiment (i.e., that 
are manipulated between subjects) do not influence cognitive control 
processes, replicating the results of the first experiment. Yet, more im-
portant, Experiment 2 indicates that motor control processes that are 
necessary to switch between response modalities, on a behavioral level, 
cannot be distinguished from and might even be the same as cognitive 
control processes that are necessary to switch between judgments.
If we understand switching between response modalities as a cog-
nitive process, one might pose the question as to whether switching be-
tween two judgments and switching between two response modalities 
is governed by the same mechanisms and, thus, is functionally similar. 
Several studies (Allport et al., 1994; Hübner, Futterer, & Steinhauser, 
2001; Kleinsorge, Heuer, & Schmidtke, 2004) showed that shift costs AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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and mean RT were comparable when subjects switched between dif-
ferent types of tasks (e.g., switching between judgments and switching 
between stimulus-response mappings in the study of Kleinsorge et al., 
2004). The size of shift costs was also similar between Experiments 1 
and 2 of the present study. These observations might tempt one to as-
sume that the same mechanisms are responsible for judgment switch-
ing  and  response-modality  switching.  Yet,  this  conclusion  would 
be premature and certainly further research is necessary to indicate 
whether judgment switching and switching between response modali-
ties is functionally similar or dissimilar. 
Apart from the question of whether similar or dissimilar mecha-
nisms govern switching between judgments and switching between 
response modalities, one can also ask whether the same or different 
brain areas are activated in both types of task switching. Previous fMRI 
studies suggested that a frontal-parietal network plays a crucial role in 
task switching (see e.g., Braver, Reynolds, & Donaldson, 2003; Dove, 
Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & von Cramon, 2000). As for other 
tasks that require cognitive control (e.g., Stroop task), the frontal cor-
tex seems to play a major role in switching between tasks (for a meta-
analysis, see Derrfuss, Brass, Neumann, & von Cramon, 2005). Yet, 
these fMRI studies explored switching between judgments only. Thus, 
it remains an open question as to whether the proposed network is 
also responsible for switching between response modalities or whether 
the differences in the nature of the tasks result in the activation of a 
(partially) different neural network. It is obvious that an answer to this 
question is necessary to complete our knowledge about the neural 
mechanisms underlying the flexible adaptation to new situations and 
to provide a complete (neural) model of task switching.
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